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Abstract 
 
The OECD proposes new nexus rules and formula-based allocation of large digital and 
consumer-oriented MNE’s residual profits to market states where the respective MNEs serve 
their customers (Pillar One Proposal, POP) combined with a worldwide minimum taxation 
regime (Pillar Two Proposal, PTP).  
POP creates a hybrid system of international profit allocation because it comes on top of the 
traditional arm’s length principle (ALP). The new hybrid system causes the risk of double 
taxation due to overlapping tax bases. In addition, MNEs have new tax planning opportunities 
when determining the amount of residual profits in the market states. 
PTP suggests an internationally agreed effective minimum tax rate combined with a 
(residence-based) income inclusion rule and a (source-based) undertaxed payment rule. In 
principle, the income inclusion rule would be sufficient and avoid an otherwise necessary 
priority rule. Without setting a minimum tax rate, the allocation of MNEs’ profits to market 
states in effect also establishes a minimum taxation regime. Therefore, waiving POP as well as 
PTP in favor of a full-fledged formula-based profit allocation scheme is a valid tax policy option.  
POP and PTP call for an unprecedented level of international tax cooperation. States have to 
agree on the details of the tax base as well as on the tax rate. Credibility is paramount for such 
far-reaching international cooperation. Up to now, the OECD has not envisaged an 
international tax agency, which has the power to establish an effective enforcement 
procedure.  
If the OECD fails to establish a long-term international tax agreement, ongoing tax competition 
may convert the corporate income tax into a pure benefit tax. National tax policy could adapt 
by placing a higher personal income tax burden on corporate profit distributions to resident 
shareholders as well as on resident shareholders’ gains from the sale of corporate shares.    
 
 
 Prof. Dr. Ulrich Schreiber, Universität Mannheim, Business School, Area Accounting & 
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1. Introduction 
In the year 2019 the OECD has proposed new nexus rules and formula-based allocation of 
MNE’s profits (Pillar One Proposal, POP) combined with a global anti-base erosion proposal 
suggesting a worldwide minimum effective tax rate (Pillar Two Proposal, PTP).1 The OECD has 
announced to complete the new proposals by the end of 2020.  
In the main, the two proposals deal with distributional and efficiency effects of profit taxation. 
POP addresses the redistribution of corporate tax revenue across states, and PTP sets a lower 
bound to international tax competition. Nevertheless, the two proposals are interrelated. POP 
has properties of a minimum taxation regime, and PTP affects the distribution of the states’ 
corporate tax revenue. Both proposals break with time-honored foundations of international 
business taxation. POP partly overrules the arm’s length principle (ALP), and PTP gives up a 
principle that the OECD had firmly upheld for decades, i.e. that setting the corporate tax rate 
is not an issue for the OECD but a matter of sovereign states.  
When the OECD published the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) in 2015,2 
it was hard to foresee that only four years later the OECD would present another proposal on 
the same issue that poses a serious threat to the about 100 years old foundation of 
international business taxation. Given that the Action Plan on BEPS with its overarching aim 
of taxing profits where value creation takes place3 seems to be a success story, why do the 
OECD’s new proposals challenge both ALP and tax rate sovereignty?  
Paradoxically, the success of the 2015 Action Plan on BEPS seems to drive the new OECD/G20 
program of work. In the post BEPS world, states do not mainly compete for internationally 
mobile book profits but for internationally mobile real investments.4 In fact, unbridled 
international tax competition is going on. In 2018, the U.S. have drastically reduced the federal 
                                                     
1 See OECD, Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of 
the Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, Paris 2019. 
2 See OECD, Explanatory Statement, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Final Reports, 2015.  
3 See Hey, “Taxation Where Value is Created” and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, April/May 2018, pp. 203-208. 
4 See Keen, Competition, Coordination and Avoidance in International Taxation, Bulletin for International 
Taxation, April/May 2018, pp. 220-225 who, in a general analysis, points at the use of unconstrained instruments 
in the presence of coordinated reduction of tax avoidance opportunities.  
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corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21%. In 2020, the United Kingdom will lower the 
statutory corporate income tax rate to 17%. Other states (among them member states of the 
European Union) have reduced the corporate income tax rate or have announced to do so.5 
When MNEs substitute international book profit shifting with international real investment 
shifting, they are in line with the Action Plan on BEPS because states tax MNEs’ profits where 
value creation takes place (i.e. where assets are used, economic functions are performed and 
risks are assumed). States suffering from this type of international tax competition face both 
a loss in profit tax revenue and an economic damage in terms of decreasing investment and 
employment.  
These observations lead to the central question: Can we reasonably expect that the new OECD 
program of work will effectively restrict harmful international tax competition? In what 
follows, the paper tries to give an answer to this question. The text sets aside the many 
technical problems involved with POP and PTP,6 and instead addresses the more fundamental 
issues, which may be decisive for a successful implementation of the OECD’s program of work. 
The rest of the paper organizes the arguments as follows.  The second section deals with the 
international double taxation risk and tax planning opportunities caused by the two types of 
international profit allocation introduced by POP. The third section examines the two types of 
minimum taxation established by POP and PTP. The fourth section evaluates the prospects of 
international tax coordination based on POP and PTP. Finally, the fifth section draws 
conclusions for national tax policy.  
2. Profit Allocation 
The 2015 Action Plan on BEPS did not fully address the tax challenges of digitalization and did 
not answer the question of how to allocate taxing rights on income from cross-border digital 
activities among states. Critics feel that the traditional nexus rules as well as the relating profit 
allocation rules fail to capture the value-added created by MNEs’ digital business in states 
where these MNEs serve their customers (market states). From an economic perspective, this 
                                                     
5 See OECD, Tax Policy Reforms 2019: OECD and Selected Partner Economies, OECD Publishing, Paris 2019, sec. 
3.2.2. 
6 See Englisch/Becker, International Minimum Taxation-The GLOBE Proposal, World Tax Journal 4/2019, 
published online: 20 September 2019.  Greil, Die Besteuerung der digitalen Wirtschaft und Zuordnung von 
Besteuerungsrechten – A Brave New World, Deutsches Steuerrecht 31/2019, pp. 1653-1660. 
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critique is flawed. The economic concept of income relates to the changes in net assets of 
(natural or legal) persons but not to places where these persons earn income.7 Therefore, 
value judgments determine the place of value creation. In the international tax arena, the 
allocation of taxing rights based on value creation is an issue of inter-nation equity. 
Internationally agreed legal conventions, not an economic concept of income, decide the 
allocation of taxing rights among states.  
Against this background, POP puts forward new nexus as well as new profit allocation rules. 
The new rules aim at allocating a share of MNEs’ taxable profits to market states. POP is 
limited to large MNEs (one could think of revenues above a 750 Mio. EUR threshold) engaged 
in digital or consumer-oriented business. MNEs not covered by POP, i.e. MNEs below the 
threshold and MNEs above the threshold with non-digital and non-consumer-oriented 
business, are still exclusively subject to profit allocation according to the ALP. In this regard, 
POP displays some similarities with the Digital Service Tax (DST) that the European 
Commission has proposed in 2018.8 The main difference between POP and the DST is the tax 
base. POP rests on large MNEs’ group profits, whereas the DST burdens large MNEs’ revenues.  
POP combines elements of formula-based profit allocation with profit allocation according to 
the ALP. Creating a new taxing right and based on internationally agreed accounting rules (e.g. 
modified IFRS), a new three-tier mechanism,9 at tier one level, allocates a share of the group’s 
residual profit (i.e. group profit exceeding an internationally agreed routine profit) to market 
states using an internationally agreed revenue-based formula. Resting on traditional taxing 
rights, at tier two level, the new mechanism assigns a fixed amount of profit to affiliates in 
market states for baseline marketing functions using the ALP (e.g. the cost plus-method) with 
the possibility of internationally agreed remuneration ratios. At tier three level, the 
mechanism allows for an additional amount compensating functions performed in the market 
state exceeding the baseline marketing functions.  
                                                     
7 See Ault/Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the US System and Its Economic Premises, in: 
Razin/Slemrod (eds.), Taxation in a Global Economy, 1990, pp. 30-31. 
8 See European Commission, COM (2018) 148 final, Bruxelles, 21.3.2018. 
9 See OECD, Public consultation document, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, 9 
October – 12 November 2019, pp. 5 and 9. 
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Obviously, POP combines two strictly opposing accounting concepts in a single profit 
allocation scheme. The ALP is an element of separate entity accounting, whereas formula-
based allocation of MNEs’ group residual profits is an element of unitary group accounting. 
The resulting hybrid system is not only very complex, most likely increasing MNEs’ compliance 
cost as well as states’ administrative cost, it may also create overlapping tax bases. The latter 
is the case if in the realm of the new taxing right the share of MNEs’ residual profits assigned 
to market states at tier one level comes on top of the profits assigned to all states (including 
market states) under extant taxing rights and the ALP at tier two and tier three level. Existing 
double taxation avoiding rules built on the ALP and separate entity accounting. These rules 
are not suited for double taxation caused by overlapping tax bases of a hybrid allocation 
scheme for MNEs’ group profit. Because avoidance of double taxation is at the heart of the 
international taxation regime, this is an essential issue not yet sufficiently addressed in detail 
by the OECD. 
To avoid overlapping tax bases, the amount of MNEs’ profits assigned to market states within 
the scope of the new taxing right has to reduce the profits allocated to affiliates within the 
scope of the ALP under existing taxing rights. An internationally agreed ratio could govern the 
pro rata deduction of residual profits allocated to market states under the new taxing right by 
formula from the profits allocated to MNEs’ affiliates under the ALP and existing taxing rights. 
Such a procedure would move POP even more in the direction of formula-based 
apportionment of profits, exacerbating the hybrid character of POP.   
In addition to avoidance of international double taxation, resistance to international tax 
planning is another overwhelming issue of an international taxation regime. Here, POP seems 
to score well. Formula apportionment of MNEs’ residual profits (tier one level) is more 
resistant to international tax planning in terms of book profit shifting than profit allocation 
under the ALP, once an internationally agreed formula is in place. Still, MNEs’ tax planning 
may have influence on the relevant markets and the amount of residual profits assigned to 
these markets.10 
                                                     
10 See Devereux/Auerbach/Keen/Osterhuis/Schön/Vella, Residual profit allocation by income, WP 19/01, Oxford 
2019, pp. 65-68. 
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MNEs’ may challenge the new taxing right by redirecting sales from states with high tax rates 
to states with low tax rates. For this purpose, MNEs could interpose an independent 
distribution company as purchaser in a low tax state. This company then provides the services 
and sells the products to the MNEs’ customers in the high tax state. One may classify the 
interposition of the independent distribution company as a B2B transaction outside the scope 
of POP. If the interposition of the independent distribution company should be within the 
scope of POP, this in principle allocates MNEs’ residual profit to the low tax state. Given the 
independent distribution company’s functions, this company should earn a comparatively low 
routine profit in the high tax state. Obviously, anti-tax avoidance rules have to complement 
POP and residual profit allocation to market states. Look-through rules could be a possible 
solution. Lock-through rules are familiar in case of affiliated companies, but may be difficult 
to implement in case of independent companies.   
Asides from this type of tax planning, residual profit allocation to market states could relate 
to MNEs’ overall residual profit or to the residual profit generated by MNEs’ value-added 
chains. Both options have different consequences for MNEs’ international tax planning. 
Breaking down MNEs’ activities into different value-added chains faces problems well known 
from transfer pricing under the ALP because it demands the same cost accounting procedures, 
which govern the determination of transfer prices based on cost. All costs, direct costs and 
overhead costs, determine the full cost of a single value-added chain. Overhead cost allocation 
is essentially arbitrary because it lacks causality (i.e. a single value-added chain does not cause 
a certain amount of overhead costs). Given this cost accounting imponderability, MNEs would 
have considerable room to maneuver in allocating profits to market states with comparatively 
lower taxes.  
This tax planning opportunities may be restricted to MNEs where profit allocation according 
to value-added chains is unavoidable because they are engaged in both B2B and B2C 
transactions in market states. However, given that some MNEs have to split residual profits 
along value-added chains, a consistent application of POP may compel the same type of 
residual profit allocation for all MNEs. In any case, states may conclude that inter-nation 
equity requires residual profit allocation along value-added chains as a basic principle because 
MNEs’ marketing activities can substantially differ across states.  
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Overall, there can be no doubt that tax complexity will substantially increase when formula-
based profit allocation within the scope of a new taxing right comes on top of profit allocation 
based on existing taxing rights and the ALP. Such a hybrid mechanism of profit allocation may 
not only create new double taxation risks but also new international tax planning 
opportunities and thereby most certainly increase the MNEs’ compliance cost as well as the 
states’ administrative costs.  
3. Minimum Taxation 
Besides suggesting new taxing rights, the OECD aims at another substantial change to the 
traditional international tax regime by proposing minimum taxation for all internationally 
operating businesses.11 Minimum taxation of profits establishes a lower bound for tax 
competition among states and stops the race to the bottom in terms of the corporate tax rate. 
In fact, coordinated minimum taxation limits states ability to attract internationally mobile 
investments. Moreover, states will find it easier to protect their national tax base against 
international tax planning efforts of MNEs.     
Under PTP, the OECD puts forward a global minimum tax regime for MNEs based on an 
internationally agreed effective minimum tax rate. An effective tax rate calls for an agreement 
on both the tax base (i.e. a set of applicable accounting rules) and the statutory tax rate. With 
respect to the tax base, PTP could build on POP. MNEs’ residence states as well as MNEs’ 
source states could establish a minimum taxation regime. The OECD’s PTP suggests that both 
states are involved. Either residence states levy the minimum tax on low taxed foreign income 
of a resident company (income inclusion rule) or source states levy the minimum tax on 
payments of a resident company to an affiliated low taxed foreign company (undertaxed 
payment rule).  
Both the income inclusion rule and the undertaxed payment rule address low tax states and 
especially tax havens. The undertaxed payment rule is applicable if a MNE has a taxable nexus 
(a subsidiary or a permanent establishment) in the source state. If a low taxed company 
provides services or sells products directly (without establishing a nexus) to customers in other 
states, only the income inclusion rule is applicable. In principle, the income inclusion rule can 
                                                     
11 See OECD, Public consultation document, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”) – Pillar Two, 8 
November 2019 – 2 December 2019, p. 6. 
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also capture low taxed profits that otherwise may be subject to the undertaxed payment rule. 
Therefore, the income inclusion rule has the wider range of application, and a comprehensive 
minimum taxation regime could solely rest on income inclusion. This is the case because 
inclusion of foreign profits in the domestic income has the well-known properties of 
worldwide income taxation: Foreign tax rates below the (domestic) minimum tax rate do not 
attract domestic investments and profits, and all domestic taxpayers face the same minimum 
tax burden irrespective where they earn the profits.   
It may well be that the OECD for fiscal reasons suggests both source-based and residence-
based taxation. This grants all states access to the tax revenue generated by minimum 
taxation. If, however, all states actually implement both rules, they have to make sure that 
the profits subject to both rules (e.g. profits of a low taxed affiliate stemming from payments 
of another affiliate) do not overlap. Consequently, an internationally agreed minimum 
taxation regime along the lines of PTP has to include an agreement which state (the source 
state or the residence state) in which cases has priority in taxing low taxed or untaxed foreign 
profits. A priority rule could recognize the taxing right of the source state combined with the 
obligation of the residence state to avoid double taxation or restrict source taxation in favor 
of residence taxation. Because PTP is silent about the details of the priority rule and thereby 
lets the tax revenue effects open, the envisaged design of the minimum taxation regime is 
essentially unclear.   
In comparison, POP and PTP seem to focus on completely different aspects of international 
taxation: PTP addresses international tax planning by minimum taxation and POP deals with 
corporate tax revenue distribution across states. In fact, however, POP does not only alter the 
tax revenue distribution among states, but (irrespective of the abovementioned possible new 
tax planning issues) also places considerable restrictions upon MNEs’ tax planning by in part 
allocating MNEs’ profits to market states. To the extent that POP does effectively assign profits 
to states, where MNEs sell products and provide services to their customers, but not to states, 
where MNEs invest, international investment shifting does not save taxes.12  
                                                     
12 See Devereux/Auerbach/Keen/Osterhuis/Schön/Vella, Residual profit allocation by income, WP 19/01, Oxford 
2019, pp. 59-64. 
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Hence, POP as well as PTP have the potential to bridle international tax competition. POP does 
so by allocating a part of MNEs’ profits to an internationally immobile tax base (depriving low 
tax states or tax havens of the respective profits), and PTP does so by establishing a minimum 
level of profit taxation for an internationally mobile tax base. POP is limited to digital and 
consumer-oriented businesses, and it is very likely that the respective customers are in fact 
internationally immobile. POP indirectly (via profit allocation to market states) determines a 
minimum level of taxation of MNEs’ profits depending on the amount of profit allocated to 
market states and the tax rates of the market states. It is worth stressing that minimum 
taxation effected by POP works without an internationally agreed effective tax rate as a mere 
byproduct of the new profit allocation rules.  
Although the minimum taxation effects of POP and PTP are in principle comparable, both 
proposals have a very different range of application. Nevertheless, POP und PTP overlap in 
cases, where both sets of minimum taxation rules are applicable. Insofar as POP indirectly 
effects minimum taxation, this should rule out direct minimum taxation under PTP, i.e. profits 
allocated to market states under POP should not be subject to PTP. Such carve out makes sure, 
that PTP exclusively focuses on internationally mobile profits. In fact, if all states agree on a 
minimum tax rate under PTP the market state should not apply a profit tax rate below the 
minimum tax rate.  
POP is limited to some MNEs but has the potential of curbing international tax competition 
much more effectively. Instead of limiting profit allocation to market states to a share of large 
digital and consumer-oriented MNEs’ residual profits, a comprehensive, revenue-based profit 
allocation scheme could assign MNEs’ overall group profits to market states. Insofar as MNEs’ 
customers are internationally immobile, investment shifting becomes useless und 
international tax competition ceases to exist. As a result, additional minimum taxation along 
the lines of PTP is no longer necessary. In the absence of international tax competition, it is 
impossible for former low tax states to compensate potentially poorer real investment 
conditions with comparatively low taxes. Conversely, higher taxes in states with comparatively 
favorable real investment conditions do not deter foreign investment. Once profit taxation 
does not distort MNEs’ investment location decisions, states providing the more 
advantageous economic environment are more attractive for real investment. Consequently, 
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in states where MNEs invest, the overall welfare effect of allocating MNEs’ profits to market 
states could be positive.   
From a fiscal perspective, however, assigning MNEs’ overall group profit to market states is a 
radical approach that would disentitle non-market states to tax MNEs’ profits, which seems 
unacceptable in terms of public good provision by non-market states. This speaks for 
allocating a part of MNEs’ profits to non-market states by designing POP as full-fledged 
formula apportionment of large MNEs’ group profits.13 As the three-tier mechanism of POP, 
formula-based profit allocation may differentiate between routine profits and residual profits. 
As a first step, such a formula determines the amount of routine profit assigned to affiliates in 
market and non-market states under traditional taxing rights. As a second step, the formula 
assigns the remaining residual profit to market states where affiliates with traditional nexus 
are located or where the new taxing right applies.  
Overall, there are good arguments to waive both the highly complex POP and PTP in favor of 
a single formula-based profit allocation scheme that assigns a share of large MNEs’ group 
profits to market states. Such a move would reduce compliance and administrative costs and 
simultaneously establish a minimum taxation regime that limits tax competition to routine 
profits.  
4. Tax Cooperation 
International tax competition gives taxpayers an exit-option, and this may exert pressure on 
states to keep the balance between taxes levied and public goods provided. On the other 
hand, international tax competition endangers the integrity of the income tax system. Profits 
shifted to foreign corporations enjoy a lower tax burden than domestic profits, and low taxed 
foreign profits may escape the higher domestic income tax by means of tax deferral or non-
taxation. In the end, international profit shifting undermines horizontal as well as vertical 
fairness of the progressive income tax and leads to undesired income redistribution effects. 
As a result, states face a tax sovereignty dilemma: In order to preserve the integrity of their 
                                                     
13 See Avi-Yonah/Clausing/Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary 
Profit Split, Florida Tax Review 2009, pp. 497-553. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD 
Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation, World Tax Journal 2010, pp. 3-18. 
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progressive income tax system, they have to give up some elements of their tax sovereignty 
by entering into an international agreement on profit taxation.   
This observation leads to the most relevant question for the OECD’s program of work. Are the 
states in a position to deal with the tax sovereignty dilemma? The answer to this question 
depends on the prospects of international cooperation in tax matters. At first glance, the 
chances for enhanced international tax cooperation seem to be very good. The OECD has set 
out to pave the way, and states seem to back the OECD’s proposals for far reaching 
international tax cooperation.  
With respect to POP, the OECD states: “Any dispute between the market jurisdiction and the 
taxpayer over any element of the proposal should be subject to legally binding and effective 
dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms.”14 Nevertheless, the design and the modus 
operandi of such a dispute prevention and resolution mechanism are up to now essentially 
unclear.  
There can be no doubt that POP calls for an unprecedented level of international tax 
coordination. POP builds on an internationally agreed set of accounting rules in order to 
determine the group profit and several internationally agreed ratios to account for the routine 
profit (related to economic functions performed by MNEs’ affiliates in different states), the 
market states’ overall share of the residual profit, and each market state’s share of this 
residual profit. Only for the remuneration of baseline marketing functions and additional 
functions performed, states can use accounting information of MNEs’ resident companies, but 
may have also to agree on remuneration ratios. All the necessary international agreements 
affect the negotiating states’ corporate tax revenues. If states in effect play a zero-sum tax 
base game (i.e. the amount of profit one state loses is equal to the amount of profit another 
state gains) they may find it very difficult if not impossible to come to an agreement on the 
several elements of POP.  
Concerning the allocation of the MNEs’ residual profit, states have to rely on shared 
information on the groups’ overall profit as well as the groups’ routine profit. Elimination of 
routine profits from the OECD’s three-tier profit allocation scheme and application of a 
                                                     
14 OECD, Public consultation document, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, 9 October 
– 12 November 2019, p. 9. 
 
 
13 
 
formula to the overall group profit could reduce complexity.15 To a certain extent, this line of 
reasoning also applies to profit allocation resting on full-fledged formula apportionment of 
MNEs’ routine as well as residual profits. The complete replacement of POP with formula 
apportionment of large MNEs’ profits could reduce complexity to an even higher degree. On 
one hand, reducing the complexity of international profit allocation cuts down compliance 
and administrative costs. On the other hand, a mechanism that pushes back the ALP in favor 
of simpler apportionment formulas may make it more difficult to reach a consensus with 
respect to the resulting tax revenue distribution. Residence states of MNEs serving the world 
market might be very reluctant to agree to a redistribution of profits largely in favor of market 
states. Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that the U.S. Treasury Secretary 
in a letter to the OECD expressed serious concerns about moves to abandon the ALP and 
existing taxable nexus standards and floated the idea of a safe harbor regime16 that in effect 
could allow the U.S. to opt-out an international agreement.   
The OECD’s PTP faces comparable problems. With respect to the income inclusion rule and 
the undertaxed payment rule, PTP explicitly mentions the need for an “ordering rule”17 in 
situations where more than one state apply the rules to the same structure, but is completely 
silent about the desirable design of such a rule. In fact, states may find it difficult to agree on 
a priority rule, given the revenue implications for either the source state or the residence 
state.  
Besides the priority rule, the main issue of PTP is the agreement on the effective minimum 
corporate tax rate, which would consequently be also applicable under POP (restricting the 
market states’ room for maneuver). This entails an agreement on a common set of applicable 
accounting rules as well as on a common statutory tax rate. Only if all states agree to common 
                                                     
15 See Fuest/Parent/Toubal, International Corporate Taxation: What Reforms? What Impact?, Les notes du 
conseil d’analyse économique, no 54, November 2019, p. 11. 
16 See Reuters, Business News, U.S. floats 'safe harbor' proposal in global taxation reform drive, December 4, 
2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-digital/u-s-floats-safe-harbor-proposal-in-global-taxation-
reform-drive-idUSKBN1Y82F8, accessed 09 December 2019).  
17 OECD, Public consultation document, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”) – Pillar Two, 8 November 
2019 – 2 December 2019, p. 6. 
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accounting rules under POP in the first place, PTP reduces to an agreement on a common 
minimum statutory tax rate.  
The OECD supports the internationally agreed minimum tax by pointing out that a state-
specific minimum tax “would result in a more complex and opaque international 
framework”.18 It is striking that the OECD says virtually nothing about how to integrate 
conflicting interests into an international agreement on minimum taxation. PTP is also silent 
on what could be the amount of the minimum tax rate. In fact, these issues pose the main 
problem of an international agreement on minimum taxation.  
To start with the minimum tax rate, there are most probably conflicting interests in choosing 
the appropriate tax rate. In the first place, all states, be they low tax or high tax states, should 
have an interest in a high minimum tax rate and the resulting increase in tax revenue they can 
share in. This is certainly the case for large high tax states suffering from international tax 
competition. These states should be in favor of a minimum tax rate that is close to (or even 
higher as) their actual statutory profit tax rate. Low tax states, however, may balance between 
tax revenue gains and overall economic losses. These states may oppose minimum tax rates 
above their actual statutory tax rates because higher tax rates may deter MNEs’ investments 
or restrict the states’ ability to compensate less advantageous real investment conditions with 
lower taxes.  
It is very likely that low tax states try to negotiate a safe-harbor rule, in effect granting them 
to opt-out a minimum tax regime. Of course, high tax states may persuade low tax states 
objecting to minimum taxation by political pressure in other fields than taxation or by non-tax 
advantages granted in the event of agreeing to the minimum tax. In the end, all states may 
find it in their interest to come to an international agreement on minimum taxation. In this 
event, PTP has the characteristics of an international tax cartel. If the tax cartel works, MNEs 
tax planning is unable to achieve effective tax rates below the minimum rate.  
This leads to the integration of conflicting interests into an agreement on minimum taxation. 
Here lie the main difficulties of PTP because there are good reasons to expect that states do 
not succeed in forming a long-term tax rate cartel. The fiscal and economic position of 
                                                     
18 OECD, Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the 
Economy, OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, Paris 2019, p. 27.  
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negotiating states before they come to an agreement (their ex ante position) differs 
substantially from their fiscal and economic position after the agreement has come into 
existence (their ex post position). In the ex ante position, all states face an internationally 
mobile tax base. It is therefore in their common fiscal interest, to substantially reduce (or even 
eliminate) tax base mobility and to share in the resulting tax revenue increase. By contrast, 
the states’ ex post position is different. Once states have concluded the international tax 
agreement, all states face a lower bound on tax base mobility. Some (smaller) states may find 
it in their interest to deviate from the agreement by setting tax rates below the minimum tax 
rate in order to increase their share in internationally mobile investments at the expense of 
other states.  
With respect to the minimum taxation characteristics of POP or comparable formula-based 
profit allocation schemes, the chances of reaching an international agreement may be better 
because states negotiate the international allocation of the profit tax base, but retain tax rate 
sovereignty. The difficulties are, however, not completely different from minimum taxation 
according to PTP. Ex ante, negotiating states may be in favor of an international agreement 
on pro rata profit allocation to market states because this reduces tax competition. Ex post, 
however, market states facing an immobile tax base may find it in their interest to increase 
their tax take by deviating from the agreed profit allocation scheme. Non-market states may 
also deviate ex post from the agreed profit allocation scheme insofar as they consider the tax 
base to be immobile, i.e. non-market states may tax quasi-rents associated with sunk capital.  
If all negotiating states anticipate that other states may deviate from the agreed rules, at least 
some states could be reluctant to agree to the rules in the first place. The negotiating states 
cannot overcome the problem of non-participation by simply committing themselves to the 
rules. Such a commitment lacks the necessary credibility as long as it is not legally binding.19 
To overcome non-participation, the credibility of the international tax agreement is 
paramount. Therefore, enforcement of the agreed rules has to be an integral part of an 
international tax agreement. Enforcement, however, calls for an international tax agency,20 
                                                     
19 See Keen/Konrad, The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination, Handbook of Public 
Economics 2013, Vol. 5, p. 287. 
20 See Tanzi, Taxation in an Integrating World, Washington, D.C. 1995. 
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which has the means and the power to establish an effective enforcement procedure. An 
institution with these powers does not exist, and sovereign states may not be ready to accept 
such an enforcement mechanism in the near future.  
Against this background, the OECD’s efforts to establish an international tax regime along the 
lines of POP and PTP may not yet have reached the critical point. What matters first, the 
enforcement problem of an international tax agreement, seems not to be the OECD’s central 
work priority. What comes second, the technical details of nexus, profit allocation, tax base 
determination, and carve-outs, are at present the main concern of the OECD. However, not 
addressing the enforcement problem in the first place may seriously damage the OECD/G20 
proposals.  
In the event the OECD fails to establish a long-term international tax agreement, states may 
put aside the taxation principles underlying POP as well as PTP and instead reconsider the 
traditional nexus rules and the ALP for digital and consumer-oriented businesses.21 However, 
it may also well be that states do not return to the traditional profit allocation rules. In this 
case, Pandora’s Box of unilateral uncoordinated action in the field of international profit 
taxation is open.  
5. Tax Policy Options 
Although it is impossible to predict how states’ tax policy will react if the OECD’s proposals for 
enhanced international tax coordination fail to set a limit to tax competition, it is not unlikely 
that a certain common national tax policy pattern may emerge. Market states facing an 
internationally immobile profit tax base may unilaterally impose taxes along the lines of POP. 
The DST (as the European Commission proposed it) or other revenue-based profit taxes with 
a much wider range of application than the DST may become attractive tax policy options for 
many states. In fact, France and Austria have already implemented a tax on certain online 
services in 2019. Other states, among them Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have 
announced to implement taxes on online services. These new taxes, be they implemented or 
be they announced, have to be seen in the light of the OECD/G20 program of work: The OECD 
reports that states have agreed to abolish unilaterally implemented taxes on digital services 
                                                     
21 See Spengel/Olbert, Taxation in the Digital Economy – Recent Policy Developments and the Question of Value 
Creation, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-010, 04/2019. 
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when they will reach an international solution.22 Conversely, this means that the respective 
states will further levy these taxes in the event an international agreement fails. 
Taxes on online services in particular and revenue-based profit taxes in general are in stark 
contrast to the established rules of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD MTC). If states with large consumer markets establish new revenue-based profit taxes, 
the rules of the OECD MTC could not deal with the resulting double taxation. In a simplified 
scenario where a MNE’s production and sales are located in different states, the states where 
production is located come under pressure, when the MNE’s sales are subject to new types of 
revenue-based taxation. Because production states face a largely mobile tax base (i.e. profits 
from internationally mobile investments) an increasing tax burden of MNEs’ my force 
production states either to grant a targeted tax relief for revenue-based taxes levied by sales 
states or to improve local investment conditions by a lower profit tax rate.  
High tax states suffering from international tax competition could unilaterally enact minimum 
taxes along the lines of PTP. The high tax states’ room to maneuver is, however, quite narrow. 
Behavioral responses of MNEs limit the capability of high tax states to implement minimum 
tax regimes because low tax states without a minimum tax regime would become even more 
attractive for MNEs’ investments. Minimum taxation based on the income inclusion rule (and 
thus extending existing CFC rules) affects all foreign low taxed profits increasing MNEs’ overall 
effective tax rate. This creates an incentive to relocate the legal seat of MNEs’ headquarters 
or affiliates. Minimum taxation based on the undertaxed payment rule does not affect all 
foreign profits, but increases the tax burden on MNEs’ local investments. This may also deter 
the affected investments. Given these adverse investment effects, uncoordinated minimum 
taxation does not substantially reduce the pressure exerted by international tax competition 
on the statutory profit tax rate.  
Ongoing international tax competition and continuing international profit shifting23 may drive 
the corporate income tax rate down to a level that is justified by the provision of local public 
                                                     
22 See OECD, Tax Policy Reforms 2019: OECD and Selected Partner Economies, OECD Publishing, Paris 2019, sec. 
3.2.5. 
23 See Janský/Palanský, Estimating the scale of profit shifting and tax revenue losses related to foreign direct 
investment, International Tax and Public Finance 26/2019, pp. 1048-1103 for recent estimates of tax revenue 
losses.  
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goods. In this case, the corporate income tax essentially works as a benefit tax. The corporate 
tax is then no longer an integral part of the progressive income tax. This would clearly damage 
the fairness of existing income taxes. Fairness perceptions of taxpayers, however, are essential 
for the acceptance of the income tax and of the tax system as a whole. Therefore, public 
opinion may exert considerable pressure on national tax policy to levy an adequate amount 
of taxes on corporate profits. However, in a world with international tax competition, states 
will find it increasingly difficult to meet such requirements of public opinion. Instead of levying 
taxes on mobile tax bases, such as corporate profits, states may shift a greater part of the tax 
burden to immobile tax bases, such as local labor income and local consumption.  
In the field of corporate taxation, a feasible tax policy option could be to readjust the 
relationship between profit taxation at the corporate level and at the shareholder level. Given 
that private resident shareholders are internationally far less mobile than corporations and 
corporate profits, income tax systems can adapt to tax competition by shifting profit taxation 
from the corporate level to the shareholder level. Higher income taxes on corporate profit 
distributions, received by resident natural persons, as well as on gains from the sale of shares 
in corporations, earned by resident natural persons, could compensate for lower corporate 
taxes.  
6. Summary 
The actual OECD/G20 program of work rests on two pillars. The pillar one proposal (POP) deals 
with new nexus rules for digital and consumer-oriented large MNEs in market states and the 
corresponding profit allocation rules. The pillar two proposal (PTP) focuses on an international 
effective minimum taxation regime for MNEs’ profits. Both, POP and PTP aim at curbing 
international tax competition, i.e. the states competition for internationally mobile 
investments and profits.   
So far, the OECD/G20 program of work deals with the details of the two technically highly 
complex proposals. The OECD is certainly aware of the unprecedented level of international 
cooperation entailed with POP and PTP. Nevertheless, up to now, the OECD does not explicitly 
address the design and the modus operandi of the respective international tax agreement. 
The states’ economic and fiscal interests are diverging. Even if the envisaged international tax 
agreement should overcome conflicting interests and negotiating states should be willing to 
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give up substantial elements of their tax sovereignty, any long-term tax agreement lacks 
credibility if it is not binding and enforceable. Obviously, an international tax agency that has 
the means and the powers to establish an effective enforcement procedure does not exist, 
and the OECD has not yet proposed an institution with these powers. Consequently, there is 
a high risk of failure for the OECD/G20 program of work.  
If the OECD/G20 efforts to bridle tax competition are not successful, the states involved in the 
process may not go back to the status quo ante, i.e. the traditional rules of international profit 
taxation. Instead, some states could unilaterally proceed with revenue-based profit taxation 
and minimum taxation along the lines of POP and PTP. This would most probably intensify tax 
competition and lead to double taxation, which the time-honored international tax rules are 
unable to deal with. Such an outcome of the actual OECD/G20 program of work has the 
potential of seriously damaging the international tax system.  
In their best interest, the negotiating states’ tax policy should prepare for such an unfavorable 
outcome by adapting the national tax system to ongoing international tax competition and to 
emerging changes in the international tax environment. A possible path for national tax policy 
to preserve the fairness of the income tax could be to compensate for the diminishing 
corporate tax burden by placing a higher personal income tax burden on corporate profit 
distributions to resident shareholders as well as on resident shareholders’ gains from the sale 
of corporate shares.    
 
